Constitutional Amendment 1 - Amendment for an Appointed Public Regulation Commission

Summary

This measure amends the constitution to provide that, after January 1, 2023, the Public Regulation Commission (PRC) shall consist of three members instead of five. Instead of members being elected from districts, this measure would create a nominating committee to develop a list of candidates and the governor would appoint three members from the list to the PRC. The commission is required to regulate public utilities and other public service companies as needed.

A "yes" vote on this amendment is a vote for changing the Public Regulation Commission (PRC) from an elected five-member commission to an appointed three-member commission.

A "no" vote on this amendment is a vote for keeping the Public Regulation Commission (PRC) as an elected five-member commission.

Arguments

"May allow for increased focus on ratepayer interests. An elected commission is a political commission, and the PRC may be even more so because its members are elected to represent specific districts in the state. When elected members represent districts instead of the entire state, their focus may be on regional electoral politics rather than the interests of ratepayers throughout the state. By insulating the commission from electoral politics, the commissioners may be better able to carry out their quasi-judicial duties in an unbiased fashion. ", in support of Constitutional Amendment 1 (Learn more)

"Offers an opportunity to renew public trust. The PRC has suffered from controversy and lack of public trust throughout its existence, some of which can be attributed to the nature of electoral politics, whereby candidates may be elected based more on name recognition and political advertisements than on professional qualifications and technical expertise. The proposed amendment would provide for increased vetting of commissioners through the establishment of a Public Regulation Commission Nominating Committee that evaluates potential nominees and submits their names to the governor for appointment, followed by senate confirmation of those appointees. This process would insulate the selection of commissioners from the political process and better ensure that well-qualified individuals are chosen to serve on the PRC, resulting in a renewal of public trust in the PRC.", in support of Constitutional Amendment 1 (Learn more)

"New Mexico would join the vast majority of states that regulate utilities through governor-appointed commissions, including the neighboring states of Colorado, Utah and Texas. If this amendment is adopted, New Mexico would be following the lead of 38 other states that provide for governor-appointed utility regulation commissions. Given the highly complex and technical nature of public utility regulation, it makes sense that commissioners should be selected on the basis of knowledge and expertise, rather than political considerations. Moreover, the double-vetting process and staggered six-year terms required by this amendment should help ensure that only well-qualified individuals are considered for appointment to the PRC, while preventing governors from packing the commission with political appointees.", in support of Constitutional Amendment 1 (Learn more)

"Promotes a better understanding of the legal complexities inherent in regulating utilities. The PRC is a quasi-judicial body, and as such, it is critical that commissioners know and understand the law and the specifics of the subject areas they regulate. However, too often the New Mexico Supreme Court has overruled PRC decisions, resulting in costs to the state and sometimes calling into question the PRC's understanding of or regard for the legal complexities inherent in regulating the state's utilities. Improved screening and qualification requirements would help ensure that commissioners possess the experience and training necessary to make decisions within the complex legal framework that governs public utility regulation.", in support of Constitutional Amendment 1 (Learn more)

"Does not address recommended changes to the PRC that may better address the efficient functioning of the commission. The key to the efficient functioning of the PRC may not necessarily lie with the manner in which commissioners are appointed. In fact, a study by the National Regulatory Research Institute (NRRI) commissioned by the legislature in 2017 offered several recommendations to improve PRC operations. Those recommendations included establishing stable funding through the fees and assessments collected by the PRC from regulated industries as is the practice in most states, increasing staff salaries to attract and keep highly skilled engineers, accountants, economists, lawyers and other professional staff that are necessary to efficiently conduct rate cases, draft rules and advise the commissioners and increasing opportunities for staff to receive ongoing training and professional development. The proposed amendment does not address any of the many recommendations that could more effectively improve the PRC's operations.", in opposition to Constitutional Amendment 1 (Learn more)

"Does not change how the PRC actually functions. As noted above, the provisions of this amendment assume that any problems with the current PRC are related to the fact that it is an elected body. The amendment, however, leaves it up to the legislature to provide for how commissioners will be evaluated and what qualifications commissioners will be required to have. Under current law, the legislature already has the power to set qualifications and continuing education requirements for commissioners. It also has the power to address all of the issues raised by the 2017 NRRI report to the legislature. There is no guarantee that the legislature will appropriately fund the PRC to address the issues raised in the 2017 report simply because the commissioners are appointed rather than elected.", in opposition to Constitutional Amendment 1 (Learn more)

"Removes the electorate's ability to directly hold commissioners accountable for their actions. Removing voters' power to directly elect commissioners dilutes the power of the electorate by transferring that decision-making authority to the Public Regulation Commission Nominating Committee, governor and senate. Electing commissioners from their respective districts allows members of the public more direct oversight of their commissioners and the decisions those commissioners make. Removing the power to elect the commissioners by district may result in reduced geographical representation because appointed commissioners could reside anywhere in the state. Even if the commissioners were appointed from different regions of the state, each commissioner would necessarily represent more persons and a larger geographic area than under the current system.", in opposition to Constitutional Amendment 1 (Learn more)

"Changing the removal process for commissioners may result in delayed proceedings. The proposed amendment provides that a commissioner may be removed "for accepting anything of value from a person or entity whose charges for services to the public are regulated by the commission, malfeasance, misfeasance or neglect of duty", but a commissioner may only be removed by impeachment. Pursuant to Article 4, Section 35 of the Constitution of New Mexico, impeachment can only be exercised by a majority of the members of the house of representatives and must be followed by a trial in the senate. Thus, impeachment of a commissioner may only occur when the legislature is convened in session or called into a special or extraordinary session, possibly delaying hearings required to respond to a serious allegation against a serving commissioner. Currently, the Constitution of New Mexico provides to the New Mexico Supreme Court the jurisdiction to remove a commissioner for cause, which may provide for a more timely response.", in opposition to Constitutional Amendment 1 (Learn more)

Measure Details